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INTRODUCTION 
Is the Roberts Court especially activist or, depending on your preference, 
especially lacking in judicial self-restraint? If we define judicial self-restraint 
as a reluctance to declare legislative action unconstitutional1 and confine the 
analysis to the 1969–2009 Terms,2 the answer is no. The Roberts Justices, just 
as their immediate predecessors, are neither uniform activists nor committed 
restraintists. Rather, the Justices’ votes to strike (and uphold) statutes seem to 
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1
 Richard A. Posner writes that at least three meanings can be assigned to the term “judicial self-
restraint”: 
(1) [J]udges apply law, they don’t make it (call this “legalism” . . . or, better, “the law made me 
do it”); (2) judges defer, to a very great extent, to decisions by other officials—appellate judges 
defer to trial judges and administrative agencies, and all judges to legislative and executive 
decisions (call this “modesty,” or “institutional competence,” or “process jurisprudence”); (3) 
judges are highly reluctant to declare legislative or executive action unconstitutional—deference 
is at its zenith when action is challenged as unconstitutional (call this “constitutional restraint”). 
Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 521 (2012). Judge 
Posner focuses on (3), as do we. But, unlike Judge Posner, we limit our analysis to legislative action. 
 
2
 This caveat is important because Epstein and Landes, analyzing data for a far longer time span (1937–
2009 Terms) but studying federal laws only, reach a somewhat different conclusion. Lee Epstein & William 
M. Landes, Was There Ever Such a Thing as Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 557 (2012). They 
find that the majority of Justices appointed before the early 1950s were reluctant to strike down laws 
regardless of whether the law accorded with their ideological values. Id. at 569–76. But for Justices appointed 
since 1952, Epstein & Landes’s findings parallel ours: the vast majority were opportunistic restraintists 
(activists), willing to uphold laws that were consistent with their policy preferences and strike those that were 
not. Id. at 573–77. 
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reflect their political preferences toward the policy content of the law, and not 
an underlying preference for restraint (or activism). 
In a nutshell, liberal Justices tend to invalidate conservative laws and 
conservative Justices, liberal laws. This holds regardless of whether we 
examine all the Justices’ votes simultaneously3 or each Justice individually.4 
I. SIMPLE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT AND 
ACTIVISM 
We are not the first to examine judicial self-restraint from an empirical 
perspective. To the contrary. More than a handful of law professors and social 
scientists have written ambitious papers using large-N datasets and 
sophisticated statistical methods.5 Curiously, though, far simpler analyses tend 
to dominate contemporary debates6—with Figure 1 providing an example. 
  
 
 
3
 See infra Part IV. 
 
4
 See infra Part V. 
 
5
 Recent examples include STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM (2009); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action During the 
Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301 (2002); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for 
Deference? The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57 POL. RES. Q. 131 (2004); Stefanie A. Lindquist & 
Rorie Spill Solberg, Judicial Review by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts: Explaining Justices’ Responses to 
Constitutional Challenges, 60 POL. RES. Q. 71 (2007); Rorie Spill Solberg & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Activism, 
Ideology, and Federalism: Judicial Behavior in Constitutional Challenges Before the Rehnquist Court, 1986–
2000, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 237 (2006); David L. Weiden, Judicial Politicization, Ideology, and 
Activism at the High Courts of the United States, Canada, and Australia, 64 POL. RES. Q. 335 (2011); and 
Tom S. Clark & Keith E. Whittington, Ideology, Partisanship, and Judicial Review of Acts of Congress, 1789–
2006 (May 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475660. Classic empirical studies of judicial invalidation of legislative action include 
Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976); 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. 
L. 279 (1957); and John B. Gates, Partisan Realignment, Unconstitutional State Policies, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1837–1964, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259 (1987). 
 
6
 By this, we mean displays or lists showing the fraction of cases in which the Justices were in the 
majority when the Court invalidated a (federal, state, or local) law. Examples, in diverse outlets, include LEE 
EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
AND CONSTRAINTS 37 (7th ed. 2011); THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: 
THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 202 tbl.6.2 (2004); and Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, So 
Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19. 
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Figure 1. Voting with the Majority When the Court Invalidates a Federal, 
State, or Local Law, 1969–2009 Terms7 
The idea behind Figure 1 (and similar data displays) is that we can learn 
about the Justices’ commitment to judicial self-restraint by studying the 
fraction of cases in which they vote with the majority when the Court 
invalidates legislative action.8 The lower the fraction, the more restrained the 
Justice (or so the argument goes). Using this strategy, we would conclude that 
the Justices located at the top of Figure 1 exercise greater restraint than the 
Justices at the bottom. Some commentators might even draw the inference that 
liberals (e.g., Brennan and Marshall) are the more aggressive and conservatives 
(e.g., Alito and Rehnquist) the meeker.9 
 
 
7
 Data are from the “Justice-Centered Data: Cases Organized by Supreme Court Citation” version of the 
U.S. Supreme Court Database at http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/ and include only orally argued cases 
(decisionType = 1, 6, or 7). We exclude Justice Sotomayor, who participated in only five cases in which the 
Court invalidated a law. 
 
8
 See, e.g., Gewirtz & Golder, supra note 6 (“One conclusion our data suggests is that those justices 
often considered more ‘liberal’—Justices Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter and John Paul 
Stevens—vote least frequently to overturn Congressional statutes, while those often labeled ‘conservative’ 
vote more frequently to do so. At least by this measure (others are possible, of course), the latter group is the 
most activist.”). 
 
9
 And, in fact, the correlation between the fraction and the Justices’ relative liberalism is between .33 
and .57 (depending on how we measure the Justices’ ideology), suggesting that liberal Justices are more 
activist. For the reasons we offer in the text, however, we should not make much (if anything) of this 
correlation. 
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As political scientists have pointed out, however, these conclusions would 
be premature because Figure 1 is flawed in at least two ways. First, it conveys 
whether a Justice is in the majority when the Court reviews the 
constitutionality of a law and invalidates it—not when the Court upholds it.10 
Besides wasting information (we can learn as much about judicial self-restraint 
from all the cases and not just invalidations), examining only “strike” cases can 
lead to misleading inferences.11 Imagine a Justice who almost always votes 
with the majority when the Court strikes a law (e.g., Justice Marshall in Figure 
1). We might conclude that he is an activist. But now suppose the Justice 
almost always votes with the majority when the Court upholds a law. Would 
we still deem him an “activist”? Probably not. 
We could supply many more examples, but the larger point is that we 
should consider the fraction of votes to strike in all cases reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws. This would go some distance toward distinguishing 
between truly aggressive justices—those willing to strike regardless of whether 
the Court does—and those who are meeker, voting with the majority regardless 
of whether the majority strikes or upholds.12 
Analyzing all constitutional review cases would help correct one of Figure 
1’s flaws. But not the second, which traces to a failure to consider explanations 
other than a Justice’s taste for judicial self-restraint.13 That is, even if we 
observe some Justices regularly voting to strike and others to uphold across all 
cases, we would not want to make claims about their relative commitment to 
judicial self-restraint without examining other possible reasons for the pattern. 
 
 
10
 See, e.g., Clark & Whittington, supra note 5, at 13 (“Neither social science analyses nor narrative 
histories of the Court and judicial review give much attention to the cases in which the Court upholds 
legislation . . . .”). 
 
11
 See Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 103, 108 (2007); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred 
Scope of Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296, 306 (1993); Clark & Whittington, supra note 5, at 8. 
 
12
 By examining all cases, we are able to develop a clearer picture of judicial self-restraint. But there are 
other problems that our approach does not solve. E.g., litigants may choose to wait to bring constitutional 
challenges until there is a “friendly” Supreme Court, and through the certiorari process, Justices may deny 
difficult cases. (For more on this and other problems, see Epstein & Landes, supra note 2.) How these affect 
our findings, we are not sure, though we should keep in mind that it takes only one litigant to raise a 
constitutional challenge, and in a situation with circuit splits, one losing party will almost always find the 
Supreme Court “friendly.” Still, we can generalize the results of our study only to the set of cases that the 
Justices agreed to hear and decide. 
 
13
 See, e.g., Lindquist et al., supra note 11, at 108; Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5. 
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Of the many possibilities,14 the Justices’ political preferences over the 
substantive policy embedded in the law has received considerable attention in 
the literature on judicial behavior. The idea is that left-leaning Justices tend to 
invalidate “conservative” laws. Vice versa for right-leaning Justices. 
A number of studies present evidence supporting this hypothesis,15 and our 
data too suggest that it has some merit. In Figure 2, in the left-hand column, we 
show the fraction of votes to strike in all cases in which the Court considered 
the constitutionality of a conservative law. The right panel shows the same 
fraction for liberal laws. Following from the literature,16 we measure the 
ideology of the law on the basis of the ideological direction of the Court’s 
decision.17 
  
 
 
14
 See infra Part III for other factors. 
 
15
 See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 5; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 415–16 (2002); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An 
Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 55–58 
(2007). 
 
16
 See, e.g., LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 5; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15. 
 
17
 Suppose the Court invalidated a law on the ground that it discriminated against gays. We would code 
the Court’s decision as liberal and the law as conservative. Fortunately, though, we did not need to make these 
decisions because the U.S. Supreme Court Database codes the ideological direction of every Supreme Court 
decision since the 1946 Term. From the “decisionDirection” variable, we constructed the ideological direction 
of the law. The Database and its definitions of “liberal” and “conservative” are available at http://www. 
supremecourtdatabase.org/. 
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Figure 2. Voting to Invalidate a Federal, State, or Local Law in All Cases 
Reviewing the Constitutionality of a Law, 1969–2009 Terms18 
A clear pattern emerges. The conservative Justices (e.g., Alito, Rehnquist, 
Roberts, and Thomas) appear at the top of the left panel of the figure, meaning 
that they exercise “judicial restraint” when reviewing conservative laws; 
liberals (e.g., Black, Ginsburg, Brennan, and Souter), on the other hand, appear 
at the top of the right panel revealing a similar level of “restraint” over liberal 
laws. 
Statistical analyses confirm this visual inspection. A regression of the 
fraction to invalidate conservative laws on the Justices’ ideology produces a 
statistically significant coefficient19 regardless of how we measure ideology.20 
 
 
18
 Stefanie Lindquist provided citations to the cases in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a 
law during the Burger and Rehnquist Court years (1969–2004 Terms); we updated the case list following her 
protocols. See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 5; Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5; Solberg & Lindquist, 
supra note 5. The Justices’ votes come from the “Justice-Centered Data: Cases Organized by Supreme Court 
Citation” version of the U.S. Supreme Court Database, available at http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/. We 
exclude Justice Sotomayor (N = 18). 
 
19
 When we use the term “statistically significant,” we mean p ≤ .05. 
 
20
 For this and all analyses to follow, we estimate the statistical models using three different measures of 
the Justices’ ideology: (1) their political party affiliation (Republican or Democrat), (2) the mean of their 
Martin–Quinn score (which is based on the Justices’ votes in non-unanimous cases), and (3) their Segal & 
Cover score. (1) is available in LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, 
AND DEVELOPMENTS (5th ed. 2011). We computed (2) from the Term-by-Term Martin–Quinn scores. See 
Measures, MARTIN–QUINN SCORES, http://www.mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (last visited July 5, 2012). 
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For example, using Segal & Cover’s time-tested ideology scores (derived from 
an analysis of newspaper editorials written prior to the Senate’s confirmation 
vote),21 the likelihood of a very conservative Justice (e.g., a Scalia) voting to 
invalidate a conservative law is a modest .27;22 for a very liberal Justice (e.g., a 
Brennan), the predicted probability jumps to .76.23 Put another way, out of 
every ten conservative laws, the model expects conservative Justices to 
invalidate three and liberal Justices, seven. When the Court reviews a liberal 
law, the conservative Justices are more likely to strike (.46) than the liberals 
(.17).24 
These regressions consider all the Justices simultaneously. Reestimating 
them for the Justices individually yields similar results. Of the twenty-one 
serving between the 1969 and 2009 Terms, eighteen exhibit aggressive (and 
meek) behavior that aligns with their ideology to a statistically significant 
degree.25 Only Justices Harlan, O’Connor, and Kennedy do not fit the 
pattern—and O’Connor is borderline.26 
II. MODELING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND SELF-RESTRAINT 
Figure 2 seems to provide a powerful demonstration of the effect of the 
Justices’ ideology (vis-à-vis the policy content of the law) on their votes to 
overturn and uphold legislation. Unless we make the heroic assumption that 
ideology is the only variable that affects votes to invalidate and uphold 
legislative action, however, it too is insufficient. Other factors likely to play a 
 
For information on how these scores are computed, see Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme 
Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1503 & n.88, 1527 n.156 (2007); 
and Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). (3)—the Segal & Cover scores—are 
available online. See Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937–2005, STONY 
BROOK U., http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/polisci/professors/qualtable.pdf (last visited July 5, 2012). 
They run from 0 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal). Id. For details on how Segal & Cover calculate the 
scores, see Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–61 (1989). 
For purposes of exposition, we report only the Segal & Cover scores in the text. Using the two other 
scores does not produce substantively different results. 
 
21
 See Segal & Cover, supra note 20. 
 
22
 The 95% confidence interval is [.15, .38]. 
 
23
 The 95% confidence interval is [.62, .90]. 
 
24
 The 95% confidence interval for the conservative Justices is [.36, .56]. For the liberals, it is [.05, .29]. 
 
25
 Again, we exclude Justice Sotomayor because she participated in only eighteen cases in which the 
Court reviewed the constitutionality of legislative action. 
 
26
 p = .10. 
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role center on (1) the Court’s case-selection process, (2) features of the law 
under review, and (3) the contemporaneous political environment.27 
To attend to the selection process, we include three variables.28 The first, 
Direction of the Lower Court’s Decision (coded 1 for liberal; 0 if otherwise), 
controls for the modern Supreme Court’s propensity to grant petitions to 
reverse the decision of the court below (i.e., even a very liberal majority will 
tend to reverse a decision below that upholds a liberal law, and vice versa for a 
conservative majority).29 Second, we include dummy variables for the three 
Chief Justice eras represented in the analysis: Burger (1969–1985 Terms), 
Rehnquist (1986–2004), and Roberts (2005–2009).30 These serve as rough 
proxies for changes in the procedures for processing cases. Finally, we 
incorporate a variable, Certiorari (1 if the case came on certiorari; 0 if 
otherwise), to control for the means by which the case arrived at the Court. As 
Whittington and Clark observe, when the Court has complete discretion over 
whether to hear a case (as on certiorari), the Justices are free to focus their 
attention only on those “that raise serious doubts about the constitutional 
validity of government policies.”31 When the Court is more constrained, the 
challenge to the legislative action may be relatively weak. (Alternatively, to 
assess the robustness of our results, we include a variable for before and after 
passage of the Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988.32) 
Turning to (2), the law under review, three relevant variables come to 
mind: whether the U.S. Congress enacted it, its substantive coverage, and its 
age. All else being equal, we expect the Court to be less likely to strike federal 
 
 
27
 We derive these from previous studies. See, e.g., Epstein & Landes, supra note 2; Howard & Segal, 
supra note 5; Lindquist et al., supra note 15; Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5; Clark & Whittington, supra 
note 5. 
 
28
 Ideally, we would also model the selection process. See Lindquist & Solberg, supra note 5, at 76–77 
(“[W]e note that the judicial review cases heard by the Supreme Court do not arise on the Court’s docket at 
random. Instead, the Court’s certiorari process is complex and often involves strategic calculations on the part 
of the justices. . . . [I]f court intervention is nonrandom, ignoring this selection process raises the likelihood 
that conclusions about the forces affecting subsequent votes to invalidate legislation will be inaccurate.” 
(citations omitted)); supra note 12. 
 
29
 Between the 1969 and 2009 Terms, the petitioning party won in 63% of the 4631 cases. This 
percentage was computed from the U.S. Supreme Court Database at http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/, 
using orally argued cases and the “partyWinning” variable. 
 
30
 Burger is the omitted era. 
 
31
 Clark & Whittington, supra note 5, at 21; accord Colker & Scott, supra note 5, at 1325 (“[T]he Court 
has considerable control over its docket and therefore tends to accept certiorari on cases in which it desires to 
reverse the lower court.”). 
 
32
 Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662, 662 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006)) (eliminating 
appeals as a matter of right from state court decisions and substituting certiorari). 
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laws (= 1) relative to legislative action in the states or localities (= 0). In part, 
this expectation reflects the claim that the Justices should or would be wary of 
invalidating a law enacted by a majority of representatives from all fifty states 
unless they are reasonably sure about its unconstitutionality.33 This expectation 
also accounts for the fact that the Office of the Solicitor General (SG) usually 
defends federal laws in the Supreme Court. Relative to the SG—a very 
effective and successful legal team by almost any measure—state and local 
attorneys are more of a mixed bag.34 Of course, the SG can file an amicus 
curiae brief in cases involving the constitutionality of state and local legislative 
action, and we attend to this with two variables (whether the SG supported the 
law or supported invalidation). 
The type of statute also may be important because, under existing 
precedent, laws centering on rights and liberties (coded 1) are presumably 
subjected to more rigorous standards of review than are economic statutes 
(coded 0). Finally, we control for the age of the law at the time of the Court’s 
decision.35 Although debatable, Dahl’s famous study suggests that older and 
less important laws are riper for invalidation than newer statutes.36 The 
mechanism, on Dahl’s account, is Article II’s command: “[The President] shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”37 Assuming the President and 
Senate have regular opportunities to appoint new Justices, “the policy views 
dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views 
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”38 
Many scholars agree that the existing regime has a role to play in judicial 
review, but they take issue with Dahl’s mechanism. To them (and us), the 
 
 
33
 Even Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “I do not think the United States would come to an end if we 
lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not 
make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, 
Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295–96 (1920). 
 
34
 At the least, they are not the “repeat player” that the federal government is. For studies on the SG, see, 
e.g., Michael A. Bailey et al., Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72 (2005); Chris Nicholson & Paul M. Collins, Jr., The 
Solicitor General’s Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court, 36 AM. POL. RES. 382 (2008); and Jeffrey 
A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger Courts, 41 W. POL. Q. 
135 (1988). 
 
35
 We thank Stefanie Lindquist for supplying this information for the 1969–2004 Terms. We updated her 
data through the 2009 Term. See supra note 18. 
 
36
 Dahl, supra note 5; accord Lindquist et al., supra note 11. 
 
37
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
38
 Dahl, supra note 5, at 285. 
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mechanism is not the appointment process but rather the Justices’ institutional 
interest in avoiding collisions with contemporaneous political actors.39 When 
the Court invalidates laws that Congress, the President, and, presumably, the 
public desire, it runs the risk of backlash in the form of jurisdiction-stripping 
laws, budget slashing, or worse.40 To capture this take on Dahl’s account,41 we 
include variables designed to measure the public’s mood (from very liberal to 
very conservative)42 and the partisan composition of the elected branches.43 
To summarize, we expect four sets of factors to influence the Justices’ 
exercise of judicial self-restraint: (1) the Justices’ ideology vis-à-vis the law, 
(2) the case-selection process, (3) the type of legislative enactment, and (4) the 
political context. We describe each in Table 1. 
  
 
 
39
 E.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 
(2001); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the 
Supreme Court’s Agenda, 71 J. POL. 574 (2009). For the most conclusive evidence to date of the effect of 
Congress on the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, see Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89 
(2011). 
 
40
 For a list of weapons Congress and the President have at their disposal in the constitutional context, 
see Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 376–77 
(1992); and Epstein et al., supra note 39, at 597–601. 
 
41
 Dahl’s story is about national institutions, while our study includes constitutional review of state and 
local laws. Nonetheless, we focus on the nation’s mood and federal institutions because, we might speculate, a 
state/local law well outside the bounds of constitutionality and opposed by the national governing coalition 
would be unlikely to reach the Court. Moreover, most state/local laws that do reach the Court may well 
implicate national political interests (or, at the least, have implications beyond the law in question) given 
Supreme Court Rule 10 (which emphasizes “important” questions). See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 
42
 To capture the public’s mood, we use Stimson’s measure. Stimson computes the measure by analyzing 
survey responses to a number of questions that tap an underlying liberal–conservative dimension. See JAMES 
A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS (2d ed. 1999); Policy Mood, U. N.C. 
CHAPEL HILL, http://www.unc.edu/~cogginse/Policy_Mood.html (last visited July 5, 2012). He provides a 
dynamic factor analysis model that combines these responses in a principled fashion to yield a quarterly and 
annual measure of public mood as a single score. See STIMSON, supra; Policy Mood, supra. 
 
43
 We added variables to indicate whether the government was unified Republican or unified Democratic. 
For more sophisticated approaches, see Segal et al., supra note 39. 
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Table 1. Description of Basic Variables 
 
Variable and Coding 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Dependent Variables 
Vote to Invalidate (= 1) or Not (= 0) if Legislative Action Is 
Liberal 
 0.338 
 0.473 
Vote to Invalidate (= 1) or Not (= 0) if Legislative Action Is 
Conservative 
 0.506 
 0.500 
Independent Variables 
Justice’s Ideology (most conservative = 0; most liberal = 1)44  0.402  
 0.332 
Direction of the Lower Court’s Decision (liberal = 1; 
conservative = 0)  
 0.543 
 0.498 
Case Came on Certiorari (= 1) or Not (= 0)  0.511     
 0.500 
Federal Law (= 1) or Not (= 0)  0.289     
 0.454 
SG Conservative Amicus (= 1) or Not (= 0)  0.100 
 0.300 
SG Liberal Amicus (= 1) or Not (= 0)  0.055     
 0.228 
Civil Liberties Law (= 1) or Not (= 0)  0.772     
 0.420 
Age of Law (at time of the decision)  15.096 
 19.344    
Unified Democratic Government (Congress and the President) 
(= 1) or Not (= 0) 
 0.203     
 0.403 
Unified Republican Government (Congress and the President) 
(= 1) or Not (= 0) 
 0.076      
 0.264 
Public’s Mood (lower numbers are more conservative)  56.507 
 3.442      
Note: Our dataset contains 7415 votes (5295 over conservative laws and 2040 for liberal 
laws) cast in 842 cases. The N for the following variables is smaller: (1) Age of Law (7352) 
because we could not identify the age in seven cases; (2) Direction of the Lower Court 
Decision (7299) because it is not specified in the Supreme Court Database in thirteen cases; 
and (3) Public’s Mood (7326) because it is not available for cases argued in 2010. 
 
 
44
 In Table 2, we report the Segal & Cover score. We also estimated the models using the Justices’ 
partisan affiliation and their Martin–Quinn scores. See supra note 20. 
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III.  RESULTS: JUSTICES COMBINED 
We begin our assessment of the impact of the variables in Table 1 by 
modeling the votes (to uphold or invalidate) of all twenty-two Justices 
(including Sotomayor) in two basic equations: one for liberal laws and the 
other for conservative laws.45 (In the next Part, we also estimate the two basic 
equations but examine the Justices individually.) 
Table 2 displays the results. Note, first, that across all four models several 
variables help account for the Justices’ votes to strike or uphold. For example, 
when the Court reviews the constitutionality of a federal law, it is more likely 
to uphold it relative to state or local legislative action. For liberal statutes, eq. 3 
predicts that the Court sustains about seven out of every ten laws passed by 
Congress but only six out of every ten enacted in the states or localities.46 For 
right-leaning statutes (eq. 4), the Justices are more likely to invalidate state and 
local policies than to uphold them (.53 [.49, .57] predicted probability to 
strike). Not so of conservative congressional laws: the predicted probability of 
invalidation is only .32.47 
  
 
 
45
 We estimated them with and without the mood measure because it is unavailable for cases argued in 
2010. Also, to check for robustness, we estimated each model using a random-effects logistic regression under 
the assumption that there may be some unaccounted factors that affect each Justice’s propensity to strike the 
legislative action. Including a Justice-specific random effect, which allows each Justice to have her own 
baseline, helps to attend to these unmodeled factors. As the note to Table 2 indicates, it does not matter 
whether we estimate the models using random-effects regression or logistic regression (clustered on the 
Justice). Ideology is significant in all the models. 
 
46
 With all other variables set at their mean or mode, the predicted probability of upholding a state/local 
law is .61 [.54, .68]; for federal laws, the figure is .71 [.61, .81]. To calculate the predicted probabilities, we 
used eq. 3. 
 
47
 We used eq. 4 with all other variables set at their mean or mode. The 95% confidence interval is [.28, 
.36]. 
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Table 2. Logistic Regressions of the Justices’ Votes to Invalidate (= 1) or 
Uphold (= 0) Legislative Action, 1969–2009 Terms 
 With Public Mood Without Public Mood 
 
Variable 
Liberal  
Law 
(1) 
Conservative  
Law 
(2) 
Liberal  
Law 
(3) 
Conservative 
Law 
(4) 
Justice’s Ideology  -1.388* 
 (0.262) 
 2.273*    
 (0.440) 
 -1.450* 
 (0.250) 
 2.229*    
 (0.442) 
Liberal Lower Court  0.623* 
 (0.106) 
 -0.270*   
 (0.049) 
 0.496*    
 (0.119) 
 -0.269*    
 (0.049) 
Certiorari  -0.015 
 (0.159) 
 0.016   
 (0.105) 
 -0.023    
 (0.175) 
 0.019     
 (0.106) 
Federal Law  -0.423* 
 (0.162) 
 -0.916*     
 (0.089) 
 -0.448*    
 (0.157) 
 -0.885*    
 (0.092) 
Dummy for 
Rehnquist Era 
 0.677* 
 (0.235) 
 0.295*   
 (0.147) 
 -0.236   
 (0.151) 
 0.264*    
 (0.124) 
Dummy for Roberts 
Era 
 0.733 
 (0.405) 
 -0.269    
 (0.289) 
 -0.233*    
 (0.279) 
 -0.394  
 (0.211) 
Conservative SG 
Amicus 
 0.434* 
 (0.165) 
 -0.832*    
 (0.121) 
 0.484*    
 (0.166) 
 -0.811*    
 (0.122) 
Liberal SG Amicus  -0.478* 
 (0.137) 
 0.645*    
 (0.225) 
 -0.426*    
 (0.138) 
 0.661*      
 (0.228) 
Civil Liberties Law  -0.023 
 (0.253) 
 0.142   
 (0.132) 
 -0.053    
 (0.242) 
 0.141  
 (0.137) 
Age of Law  -0.000 
 (0.003) 
 -0.004* 
 (0.001) 
 -0.001   
 (0.003) 
 -0.004*    
 (0.001) 
Unified Democratic  -0.251 
 (0.130) 
 -0.002 
 (0.101) 
 0.217*    
 (0.100) 
 0.022 
 (0.104) 
Unified Republican  -0.705* 
 (0.204) 
 0.057   
 (0.167) 
 -0.449   
 (0.239) 
 0.091 
 (0.188) 
Public Mood  -0.162* 
 (0.040) 
 -0.009   
 (0.019) 
_____ _____ 
Constant  8.416* 
 (2.078) 
 -0.110    
 (1.091) 
 0.395    
 (0.178) 
 -0.817*    
 (0.309) 
N of Votes 1977   5170   2013 5223 
Log Likelihood -1159.084 -3129.070 -1205.065 -3167.552 
Notes: 
(1) p ≤ .05. Variables statistically significant (at p ≤ .05) and correctly signed across all 
models are in italics. Standard errors are in parentheses. For all four models, we 
clustered on Justice. 
(2) Includes all twenty-two Justices serving between the 1969 and 2009 Terms. 
(3) We present models with (1 & 2) and without (3 & 4) Public Mood because mood 
data are available only for cases argued through 2009. 
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(4) We conducted two types of robustness checks: (1) we substituted two other 
measures for the Segal & Cover scores; and (2) we estimated the models using 
random-effects logistic regression, with the “panel” set to Justice.48 Neither 
produced substantively different results. 
We do not know whether the preference for federal over state and local 
laws reflects extreme reluctance to invalidate action taken by the U.S. 
Congress or the expertise of the SG. We can report, though, that the presence 
of the SG as an amicus curiae exerts a statistically significant effect on the 
Court’s willingness to strike or uphold state/local policies. Suppose the Justices 
are reviewing a liberal state (or local) law, and the SG files in support. The 
odds of the Court upholding the law are relatively high (.71 [.64, .77]).49 But 
should the SG argue for invalidation, the odds of upholding fall to about 50–
50.50 We see a similar, though even more dramatic, effect for conservative 
state/local laws. The probability flips from .67 to uphold when the SG files in 
support51 to .69 to invalidate when the SG files in opposition.52 
No doubt, then, a host of factors affect the Justices’ votes. And yet, the 
basic ideological effect unearthed in Figure 2 remains. Regardless of how we 
specify the models in Table 2, we cannot wipe out the central finding that 
conservative Justices are significantly more likely to strike liberal statutes and 
liberals, conservative laws.53 The statistical effect is that persistent and that 
consistent. It is also quite strong, as Figure 3 shows. 
  
 
 
48
 See supra note 20. 
 
49
 We used eq. 3 with all other variables set at their mean or mode. 
 
50
 .49 [.39, .59]. 
 
51
 We used eq. 4 with all other variables set at their mean or mode. The 95% confidence interval is [.54, 
.79]. 
 
52
 The 95% confidence interval is [.56, .81]. 
 
53
 See supra notes accompanying Table 2. 
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Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Invalidating Legislative Action Across the 
Range of Ideology 
 
Notes: 
(1) The panel on the left is based on eq. 3 in Table 2. The panel on the right is from eq. 
4. All other variables are set at their mean or mode. 
(2) The solid line shows the predicted probability; the dashed lines show the upper and 
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval. 
Starting with the left panel, the probability of invalidating a liberal law 
decreases from .52 to an improbable .20 as we move from the most 
conservative to most liberal Justices, all else being equal. As for conservative 
laws, the probability declines even more dramatically, from a .81 invalidation 
prediction for the most liberal Justices to .31 for the extreme conservatives. 
Does this suggest that the liberal Justices are more “strike happy” (i.e., 
more activist) than the conservatives? Perhaps.54 But the comparison assumes 
an equal number of opportunities to invalidate conservative and liberal laws—
an assumption that the data do not meet. As the totals in Table 2 indicate, 
 
 
54
 To reiterate, for liberal laws, extreme conservatives invalidate about 52% of the time, compared to 
81% for extreme liberals. 
EPSTEIN&MARTIN GALLEYS5 7/12/2012  3:38 PM 
752 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:737 
between the 1969 and 2009 Terms, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
conservative laws nearly three times as often as liberal laws.55 
Finally, and of special relevance to our claim about the Roberts Justices, 
the effect of ideology is relatively consistent across all three Chief Justice eras. 
Variations on all the regressions in Table 2 yield significant coefficients on the 
Justice’s Ideology variable when we estimate them separately by Chief Justice 
era.
56
 Figure 4 displays the predictions. 
Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Invalidating Legislative Action Across the 
Range of Ideology, by Chief Justice Era 
4a. Liberal Law 
 
  
 
 
55
 Although we can only speculate on why this is the case, the answer must come from either the supply 
side or the demand side—the supply of legal provisions to review or the demand to review by the Justices. On 
the supply side, much of the existing law was conservative, especially in the domains of civil rights and civil 
liberties. On the demand side, a Court with a liberal majority, at least until the presidency of George H.W. 
Bush, would typically choose to review conservative laws, all else being equal. On this logic, we would expect 
the Roberts Court to consider the constitutionality of a greater number of liberal legal provisions than 
conservative ones. 
 
56
 See infra notes accompanying Figure 4. 
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4b. Conservative Law 
Notes: 
(1) The solid line shows the predicted probability; the dashed lines show the upper and 
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval. 
(2) In all panels, we constrain ideology to under 0.8 because no Justice on the Roberts 
Court has an ideology score in the 0.8–1.0 range. 
(3) The predictions follow from eqs. 3 & 4 in Table 2. Also, for purposes of estimating 
the same model across all three eras, we dropped Certiorari, Unified Democrat, 
and Unified Republican (which created collinearity problems in some of the 
equations). 
Looking across the panels, a similar pattern emerges. Conservatives are far 
more likely to strike liberal laws, while the liberals are far more likely to 
uphold them. The same holds in reverse for conservative laws. 
And it generally holds for the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Justices, 
though some potentially intriguing trends emerge. Turning first to the left wing 
of the Court, a comparison of the two panels in Figure 4 shows that the liberals 
have grown less willing to strike liberal laws, from a predicted probability of 
.35 during the Burger years, to .23 during the Rehnquist Court, to .06 for the 
Roberts years. But they are also less likely to strike laws with conservative 
policy content (the predicted probability declines from .78 in the Rehnquist era 
to .62 in the Roberts era). The right wing of the Court, on the other hand, has 
grown somewhat more opportunistically restraintist (activist). The 
conservative Justices are less willing to invalidate conservative laws, from a 
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predicted probability of .36 during the Rehnquist years to .15 for the Roberts 
era. At the same time, as Figure 4b shows, their willingness to strike laws has 
increased slightly, from .55 (Rehnquist Court) to .58 (Roberts Court). 
IV.  RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES 
Whether these are trends or blips due to data sparseness for the Roberts 
Court, we cannot say. Moreover, even if they are trends, we do not know if 
they reflect a growing tendency toward judicial self-restraint on the part of the 
liberals (and opportunistic restraint on the part of conservatives) or unmodeled 
features of the case-selection process. 
What we can do is explore how many of the individual Justices conform to 
the basic patterns unearthed in Table 2 and Figure 4. We do so by estimating 
separate regression models for each of the nineteen Justices with fifty or more 
case participations. Table 3 displays the results.57 
  
 
 
57
 This eliminates Justices Black (N = 37), Harlan (N = 44), and Sotomayor (N = 18). 
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Table 3. Predicted Probability of Invalidating Legislative Action for Nineteen 
Justices with More Than Fifty Case Participations, 1969–2009 Terms 
Justice (Order from 
Most Conservative to 
Most Liberal58) (N) 
 
Coefficient on 
“Law”  
(1 = liberal; 0 = 
otherwise) 
Predicted Probability 
of Striking a 
Conservative Law 
Predicted 
Probability of 
Striking a Liberal 
Law 
Thomas (247) 1.847* 
(0.329) 
0.20 
[0.13, 0.28] 
0.62 
[0.47, 0.76] 
Rehnquist (682) 1.649* 
(0.241) 
0.17 
[0.13, 0.22] 
0.51 
[0.40, 0.63] 
Scalia (362) 1.416* 
(0.271) 
0.27 
[0.21, 0.35] 
0.61 
[0.47, 0.72] 
Burger (458) 0.674* 
(0.289) 
0.36 
[0.29, 0.44] 
0.53 
[0.38, 0.67] 
Alito (59) 5.277* 
(1.769) 
0.02 
[0.00-0.09] 
0.54 
[0.10-0.94] 
Roberts (65) 1.509* 
(0.699) 
0.17 
[0.06-0.37] 
0.46 
[0.16-0.79] 
Powell (415) -0.761* 
(0.287) 
0.50 
[0.42, 0.59] 
0.32 
[0.20, 0.45] 
O’Connor (415) 0.382 
(0.240) 
____ ____ 
Kennedy (323) 0.252 
(0.263) 
____ ____ 
Stewart (336) -0.499 
(0.355) 
____ ____ 
White (606) -0.838* 
(0.255) 
0.46 
[0.39, 0.53] 
0.27 
[0.17, 0.39] 
Blackmun (600) -1.478* 
(0.263) 
0.62 
[0.55, 0.69] 
0.28 
[0.19, 0.39] 
Souter (241) -2.237* 
[0.355] 
0.71 
[0.60, 0.80] 
0.22 
[0.11, 0.35] 
Breyer (200) -1.838* 
[0.382] 
0.53 
[0.41, 0.65] 
0.16 
[0.07, 0.29] 
Ginsburg (206) -2.309* 
[0.368] 
0.67 
[0.54, 0.78] 
0.17 
[0.08, 0.30] 
Stevens (636) -1.882* 
[0.229] 
0.72 
[0.66, 0.77] 
0.28 
[0.20, 0.38] 
Brennan (550) -3.530* 
(0.360) 
0.89  
[0.84, 0.92] 
0.20 
[0.11, 0.32] 
Marshall (561) -3.343* 
(0.324) 
0.89 
[0.85, 0.93] 
0.23 
[0.14, 0.36] 
Douglas (158) -3.573*  
(0.772) 
0.90   
[0.80, 0.96] 
0.23 
[0.05, 0.52] 
 
 
58
 We used the mean of the Martin–Quinn scores. 
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Notes: 
(1) p ≤ .05. 
(2) We estimated the coefficients via logistic-regression models, with robust standard 
errors. In addition to a variable indicating whether the law was liberal or 
conservative, the models include (from Table 2) Liberal Lower Court Decision, 
Federal Law, Civil Liberties Law, and Age of Law.59 To assess robustness, we also 
estimated the model with asymptotic standard errors, with robust standard errors 
clustered by Term, and with a random-effects logistic-regression model. These 
alternative specifications do not affect the basic results or substantive conclusions. 
(3) We estimated the predicted probabilities using the same model for each Justice and 
setting all variables (except the ideological content of the law) at their mean or 
mode. We do not estimate probabilities for Justices with coefficients that are not 
statistically significant on the variable indicating the ideological direction of the 
law. 
Even after controlling for other factors that might influence votes to 
invalidate or sustain legislation, ideology exerts a significant effect for sixteen 
of the nineteen Justices (84%). The five most conservative Justices in our 
dataset (Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, Burger, and Alito) are all highly unlikely 
to invalidate conservative laws. The range in the predicted probabilities of 
invalidating is narrow, from .36 for Burger to .02 for Alito. The five most 
liberal Justices (Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, and Ginsburg), on the 
other hand, are highly unlikely to sustain conservative laws. The model 
predicts that Ginsburg, the most likely of the five to uphold, votes to strike in 
seven out of every ten cases; Douglas, the least likely, strikes in nine out of 
ten. The story is much the same for left-leaning laws, only in the reverse. 
Moving down the third column (from the most conservative to most liberal 
Justice), the predicted probability of invalidating a liberal law declines in a 
near monotonic fashion. 
What of the Roberts Justices? Though it may be too soon to say much 
about Alito and Roberts (their Ns are small and the confidence intervals around 
the predictions, large), they conform to the basic ideological pattern. Both are 
significantly more likely to uphold conservative laws and invalidate left-
leaning policy. The ideological effect is even starker for the more extreme 
conservatives, Scalia and Thomas. As for the four left-leaning Justices in our 
 
 
59
 We included these variables, and not others in Table 2, to maximize the number of cases and to 
minimize collinearity problems in some of the models (and to depict the coefficients for the same model for 
each Justice). We assessed robustness by adding as many variables as we could to each model. The basic 
findings remain unchanged. 
EPSTEIN&MARTIN GALLEYS5 7/12/2012  3:38 PM 
2012] IS THE ROBERTS COURT ESPECIALLY ACTIVIST? 757 
dataset (Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens), they too evince a different 
approach to judicial review, based on the underlying policy content of the law. 
The Court’s “super median,”60 Justice Kennedy, is more of a puzzle. 
Judged on the basis of whether he was in the majority when the Court struck 
down legislative action, Kennedy is the most aggressive of the Roberts 
Justices.61 When the Court invalidated a federal, state, or local law between the 
2005–2009 Terms, Kennedy was in the majority 94% of the time. Only 
Roberts (at 72%) came close. But, unlike the other Roberts Justices, no 
underlying ideological pattern seems to exist to Kennedy’s votes; as a 
statistical matter, he is equally as likely to sustain (or invalidate) conservative 
as liberal laws. 
If, however, we consider only laws reviewed by the Court since the start of 
the Roberts Court years, even Kennedy’s ideology shows in his votes—he too 
is now substantially more likely to strike liberal laws than conservative laws.62 
Along these lines, Figure 5 is illuminating. There we compare the predicted 
probabilities of invalidating laws for Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Alito 
since the 2005 Term. All else being equal, Kennedy is not as extreme as either 
Roberts or Breyer, but the difference in his willingness to invalidate liberal 
versus conservative law is substantial: 38% versus 16%. 
  
 
 
60
 Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2008). 
 
61
 And, indeed, Kennedy is the most aggressive Justice in our entire dataset. See Figure 1. 
 
62
 He is significantly (p = .03) more likely to invalidate liberal state/local policies, though not federal 
laws. Modeling all laws in one equation (with a variable indicating whether the law was federal or state/local) 
yields a p-value of .07 on the Ideology of the Law variable. The p-value for all Terms prior to 2004 is not close 
to statistically significant (.84). 
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Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Invalidating a Law for Justices Ginsburg, 
Kennedy, and Alito, 2005–2009 Terms 
Note: We generated the predictions using the same models in Table 3, except we limited 
them to the Roberts Court years. 
CONCLUSION 
Ours will certainly not be the last word on judicial review during the 
Roberts years. The data we have amassed cover only the first five Terms of the 
current era. As Justices come and go, the Court may move further to the right, 
turn sharply to the left, or perhaps steer a more moderate course. Whether the 
underlying patterns we have uncovered will dissipate remains another story. At 
least since 1969,63 there is a clear ideological structure to the Court’s review of 
the constitutionality of federal, state, and local laws—the Roberts Justices not 
excepted. 
 
 
 
63
 And maybe well before. See Epstein & Landes, supra note 2; Clark & Whittington, supra note 5. 
